Thu Sep 30, 2004
A Case for Kerry
As anyone who reads this blog knows, my plan is to vote for Bush. But Michael Totten (via InstaPundit) has laid out a very interesting argument in favor of Kerry, eloquently articulating a thread of thought that has lurked in the back of my own mind for a while, which I hadn't figured out how to resolve.
It goes like this: Michael Totten, first of all, recognizes that the "Bush Doctrine" is the right one necessary to win World War IV, the war against Islamofascism; that the policy of preemption which got us to Iraq is precisely the policy we need to continue during the next four years. He also recognizes that Kerry has been anything but a firm supporter of the Bush Doctrine:
The hawkish case against John Kerry is that his strategy -- such as it is -- is reactive. He promises to respond to any attack. I have no doubt he will. He isn't a pacifist.
The trouble is that, unlike President Bush, he doesn't have a pro-active strategy. Bush's push for democracy in the Middle East may or may not address the problem of terrorism constructively, but at least he's going after root causes and is willing to pre-empt a threat.
The trouble is that, unlike President Bush, he doesn't have a pro-active strategy. Bush's push for democracy in the Middle East may or may not address the problem of terrorism constructively, but at least he's going after root causes and is willing to pre-empt a threat.
But being in a position of responsibility does strange things to someone, as I remarked in May. It's easy to criticize from the sidelines (Totten notes that the Republicans attacked Clinton during the bombing of Kosovo in the same hysterical and irrational way that Democrats now attack Bush). It's much more difficult to follow through on those criticisms when you're actually in a position to seriously effect U.S. policy. Totten says:
John Kerry is not interested in pre-emption now. But he is not in office. He is not responsible for the defense of the country today. He does not receive the same intelligence briefings as Bush, nor does he have advisors who suggest actual courses of action. He has campaign advisors, and they are completely different animals.
Norman Podhoretz writes that, in the last World War (the Cold War), the new doctrine of containment was just as vigorously challenged by Eisenhower, only to be ultimately adopted by him:
[E]nough bitter opposition remained within and around the Republican party to leave it uncertain as to whether containment was an American policy or only the policy of the Democrats. This uncertainty was exacerbated by the presidential election of 1952, when the Republicans behind Dwight D. Eisenhower ran against Truman’s hand-picked successor Adlai Stevenson in a campaign featuring strident attacks on the Truman Doctrine by Eisenhower’s running mate Richard Nixon and his future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Nixon, for example, mocked Stevenson as a graduate of the "Cowardly College of Communist Containment" run by Truman’s Secretary of State Dean Acheson, while Dulles repeatedly called for ditching containment in favor of a policy of "rollback" and "liberation." And both Nixon and Dulles strongly signaled their endorsement of General Douglas MacArthur’s insistence that Truman was wrong to settle for holding the line in Korea instead of going all the way—or, as MacArthur had famously put it, "There is no substitute for victory."
Yet when Eisenhower came into office, he hardly touched a hair on the head of the Truman Doctrine. Far from adopting a bolder and more aggressive strategy, the new President ended the Korean war on the basis of the status quo ante—in other words, precisely on the terms of containment. Even more telling was Eisenhower’s refusal three years later to intervene when the Hungarians, apparently encouraged by the rhetoric of liberation still being employed in the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe, rose up in revolt against their Soviet masters. For better or worse, this finally dispelled any lingering doubt as to whether containment was the policy just of the Democratic party. With full bipartisan support behind it, the Truman Doctrine had become the official policy of the United States of America.
Yet when Eisenhower came into office, he hardly touched a hair on the head of the Truman Doctrine. Far from adopting a bolder and more aggressive strategy, the new President ended the Korean war on the basis of the status quo ante—in other words, precisely on the terms of containment. Even more telling was Eisenhower’s refusal three years later to intervene when the Hungarians, apparently encouraged by the rhetoric of liberation still being employed in the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe, rose up in revolt against their Soviet masters. For better or worse, this finally dispelled any lingering doubt as to whether containment was the policy just of the Democratic party. With full bipartisan support behind it, the Truman Doctrine had become the official policy of the United States of America.
OK, so John Kerry might ultimately continue the Bush Doctrine (though maybe not with the same conviction or understanding), but why would we take a risk on what he might do, when we know that Bush will do the right thing? In other words, what's the upside potential to voting for John Kerry?
No one can deny that the invasion of Iraq has cost Bush a tremendous amount of political capital. Incredibly divisive to begin with, it's even more so since WMD stockpiles were ultimately not found in Iraq (not Bush's fault, but his opponents act like it is).
A basic rule in warfare is divide and conquer. The corollary of that is don't let your enemy divide you. If there's one thing that's true about America, it's that when it has the will to do something, it will do it, plain and simple. When its citizens strongly believe in the value of an objective, that objective will be achieved. But right now we're divided. And not only internally. We're divided diplomatically from several other influential Western democracies.
"Only Nixon could go to China," and "only Kerry can confirm that Vietnam was a just war," as he implicitly did in his acceptance speech at the DNC. By extension (says Totten):
Democrats will justifiably scoff if Bush wants to wage another pre-emptive war. But they won't scoff if John Kerry does. They will sit up and take notice, and so will some people in Europe. Kerry can change the minds of skeptics. Bush can't.
In other words, only Kerry can go to Iran.
Thus, the strongest argument for Kerry is that he alone has the ability to divide the political forces which oppose the Bush Doctrine, because they cannot unite as strongly together if the man carrying the torch of that doctrine is a Democrat:
Journalists at prestigious and influential left-leaning media outlets like NPR and the New York Times will feel a bit less temptation to put a morale-sapping doom-and-gloom spin on our progress made in the Terror War. "Their guy," after all, will be the one waging it.
And ultimately, that is what it is important. I am not so concerned about the help of our French "allies" (not that Kerry is respecting our real allies, e.g. Allawi of Iraq and Howard of Australia). Watching Dominique de Villepin on Charlie Rose, I am convinced that they are so far removed from any sense of responsibility that they will never be united with us in this war. But Americans can, and should, be united in our objectives. Perhaps Kerry can unite us, precisely by his failure to achieve what he claims Bush failed to try:
Anti-Americanism will be a feature of the world's political landscape until our military power is matched. John Kerry might be able to finesse this problem a bit, but there is no way he can fix it. And when it's shown he can't fix it, liberals will take the upsurge in anti-Americanism personally. George W. Bush will no longer be there to act as a blame-magnet.
The brief period of national unity after the attack on September 11 came from the understanding that we're hated, we're under attack, and we're in this together. President Bush will never bring us back to that place unless Al Qaeda hits us again. John Kerry might be able to do so if and when his trans-Atlantic unity project fails.
The brief period of national unity after the attack on September 11 came from the understanding that we're hated, we're under attack, and we're in this together. President Bush will never bring us back to that place unless Al Qaeda hits us again. John Kerry might be able to do so if and when his trans-Atlantic unity project fails.
Of course, this is all irrelevant if Kerry does not ultimately adopt the Bush Doctrine. But:
[W]hich will be harder? Changing the mind of one? Or changing the minds of millions?
It's a compelling case. The strongest I've ever read.
For nearly a year now, I've had a post brewing in my head for November 3rd, should John Kerry be elected. My plan is to make a pledge to give his policies a chance and the benefit of the doubt. To act as if I want him to succeed, and as if I believe he will succeed. And, also, to refrain from the vitriol which has so terribly emanated from the left these past years.
It might work. If forced, I'll go along and give it a try.
But I'm not voting for John Kerry.
To me, this whole argument is predicated on psychological theories about "ordinary men in extraordinary circumstances". In other words, John Kerry's an ordinary man now, but when he becomes president, he'll be forced to make the responsible choices that any intelligent person would make in his shoes — the choices Bush is making now.
The problem is we can't judge people by how our psychological theories say they'll act. We have to judge people, as much as we can, by how they have acted, including what they have said. If someone pleads guilty to murder, you put that person in jail, plain and simple. You can try to sympathize with and rationalize that guilty plea all you want, but the fact of the matter is: he plead guilty. If he didn't really commit the crime, and he was just trying to get a lighter sentence, you can't be expected to know that. Above all, you have to be able to depend on someone's own words as a reliable indicator of what they have done and what they will do.
Similarly, if someone is pointing a gun at you, and threatening to shoot you, you defend yourself. If that person wasn't really going to kill you, well, that's just too bad. We have to hold people responsible for the things they say and the impressions they deliberately give.
Now, John Kerry is not a criminal, but I made the analogy simply to illustrate the fact that a politician is equally responsible for at least making the right promises (following through is another matter entirely, but Bush has a record: he invented the Bush Doctrine). Kerry has clearly promised to not follow the Bush Doctrine. Is it possible he will break that promise? Yes. But I will not vote for someone on the hope that he will break his own promise.
This pro-Kerry argument is also based on the assumption that a Kerry presidency would serve as a unifying political force for Americans. But if you're talking about domestic political effects, don't underestimate the inherent political force this election has as, essentially, a referendum on the Bush Doctrine. We have the ability, in November, to recharge the political capital that Bush has spent. Alternatively, we have the ability make a declaration that we do not accept his policy of preemption. If we make such a clear statement, how can Kerry conceivably ignore it?
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